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is not to be liable for such as existed previous to her taking
possession.
It is difficult to imagine a case to which the rule of expressio
unius, &c., could be more justly and more properly applied than
the case now under consideration.
I-am thus irresistibly led to the conclusion, that the defendant
is not, as between her and George Harrison and his representa.
tives the plaintiffs, liable or bound to pay any part of the taxes
existing at the time of her marriage, or at the time of the death
of John Harrison; and, of course, if any such taxes have been
paid by her out of her property, that she has the right to claim
and recover them from the plaintiffs.
IV. It must be remembered, that the question here is between
the dowress and the devisee of her husband ; not between her
and creditors having a lien on her husband's real estate, existing
at the time of the marriage. The latter have preference to her,
and her dower is subject to all such liens. This proposition is toc
clear and too reasonable to require the citation of authorities on
the subject-of course her dower rights are subject to all existing
taxes whenever imposed ; the practical meaning of which is, that
the government (state or municipal) has the right to collect the
taxes out of the estate irrespective of dower.
If the taxes are collected in whole or in part, out of the interest or estate of the dowress, whether actually set apart to* her
after her husband's death or not, she has her resort to the heir,
devisee, or executor, as the case may be, for reimbursement.
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Opinion of the court by
WAGNER, J.-The question involved relates to the power of
the state to assess, levy, and collect a tax on the property owned
by the defendant in error. In 1853 the legislature incorporated
the Eliot Seminary, and provided that the incorporatorsi their
associates and successors, should be constituted a body corporate
and politic, by the name of the Eliot Seminaryand by that name
should have perpetubl sucession, andbe capable of taking and
holding by gift, grant, devise, or otherwise, and conveying, leas-'
ing, or otherwise disposing of any estate, real, personal, or mixed,
annuities, endowments, franchises, and other hereditaments, which
might conduce to the support of the said seminary or the prbmotion of its object; that the property of the said corporation should
be exempt from taxation, and the 6th, 7th, and 8th sections of the
'first article of .the act concerning corporations, approved March
19th 1845, should not apply to it: Sess. Acts, 1853, p. 290. The
legislature, by an amendatory act in 1857, bhanged the name of
.the Eliot Semipary to that of the Washington University: Acts
1857, p. 610.
The 7th section of the General Corporation Law of 1845 provided that the charter of every corporation that should be there
after granted by the legislature should be subject to alteration,
suspension, and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature.
When the law was passed granting the charter, there was no
express prohibition restraining the legislature from exempting'
property from taxation; but by the present constitution it is
declared that "no property, real or personal, shall be exempt.
from taxation, except such as may belong to the United States,
-to this state, to counties, or to municipal corporations in this
state." In pursuance of this clause of the constitution, the legislature passed a law for the assessment and collection of the revenue, by virtue of which the property of the defendant in error
was subject to taxation.
It is now insisted that the charter was an irrepealable contract,and perpetually exempted the property of the corporation from
taxation. The charter is unusual and of marked peculiarity.
There is no preamble to the act, anid no limit to its duration, or
to the amount of property which it may hold. No obligations are
cast upon the corporation ; it stipulates for nothing, and agrees
to give no consideration whatever for the extraordinary privileges
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thus granted. The intention was, we suppose, to establish an
institution of learning, but there is nothing to. prevent the corporation from accumulating and absorbing millions of wealth, and
there is no corresponding obligation imposed to carry out any
contemplated object.
To determine correctly this question, it is of the utmost importance that we arrive at a just conclusion in regard to the nature
of the act. If it be indeed a contract it must stand, and the state
is bound by it, however inexpedient or injudicious- it may have
been when made. By the Constitution of the United States, no state
can pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. There is no
prohibitory clause in the Constitution which has given rise to
more protracted litigation and various and'profofind discussions
than the one above quoted. .The counsel for the defendant in
error has cited numerous adjudged cases from the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, and contends that they
are conclusive and uncon'trollable authority here. If they are
upon the same point, and pass on the question presented in this
case, they must be considered as decisive, for it appropriately
belongs to that tribunal to put a final construction on the national
Constitution. It may be advantageous to examine some of the
cases on this subject, decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and compare them with the case we are now considering,
that 'we may ascertain what effect those decisions shojuld have in
the present instance.
The first case of this kind which came before that court,
and where the subject received a very thorough discussion,
was the celebrated one of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crandh 87.
There the legislature of Georgia, by an Act of the 7th of Jan-.
uary 1795, authorized the sale of a large tract of wild land, and
a grant was made by letters patent, in pursuance of the act, to a
number of individuals, under the name of the Georgia Company.
Fletcher held a deed from Peck for a part of this land, under a
title derived from the patent; by which deed Peck had covenanted
that the state of Georgia was lawfully seised when the act was
passed, and had a good right to sell, and that the letters patent
were lawfully issued, and that the title had not since been .legally
impaired. The action was for breach of covenant, and the breach
assigaed was that the letters patent were v.oid, for that the legis.
lature of Georgia, by the Act of the 18th. of February 1796,
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declarcd the preceding act to be null 'and void, as being foulided
in fraud and corruption. This directly brought before the court
the question whether the legislature of Georgia could constitutionally repeal the Act of 1795, and rescind the sale made under
it. Tue court declared that when a law was in its nature a contracc, and absolute rights have vested under that contract, a
repeal of the law could not divest those rights, nor annihilate or
impair the title so acquired. A granf"was a. contract within the.
meaning of the Constitution.
The words of the Constitution were construed to comprehend
equally executory and executed contracts, for each of them contahns obligations which are binding on the parties. A grant is a
contract executed, and a party will always be held to be estopped
by his own grant. A party cannot pronounce his own deed invalid, whatever cause -may be. assigned for its invalidity, though
that party be the legislature of the state. It was accordingly
held that the State of Geoigia having parted with the estate of
the lands, and.that estate having passed into the hands of a bond
fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, that state was constitutionally disabled from passing any law whereby the estate of
the plaintiff could be legally impaired and rendered void. No
one could for a moment entertain a doubt about that being a case
of contract. The State of Georgia, had sold the land for a valuable consideration and conveyed it by deed to the purchaser. The
title'was actually vested in the grantees, and the contract exe-'
cuted. But had it been only executory it would have been
equally obligatory; and had the purchaser-agreed at a future day
to pay, and the state, in consideration thereof, agreed to convey
the lands, there could be very little dispute about its being a
contract. The only questions involved in the case were, does the
constitutional provision extend to contracts made by states, and
has a state, being a party to a contract, a right to declare that
contract void for fraud committed by its own governmentiin the
execution of that contract, upon the rights of those represented ?
The case of The State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch
164, is similar to that of Fletcher v. Peck in its principles.
There, in consideration that the Delaware Indians released to the
State of New Jersey their right to certain lands, the legislature
declared by law, that the land purchased for the Indians should
not be subject to taxation. The Indians. subsequently, with the
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consent of the legislature, sold the lands they acquired, and the
legislature by subsequent enactment imposed a tax on those lands.
This wad determined by the Supreme Court of the United Stateb
to be a violation of the contract made with the Indians, the benefit
of which accompanied the titl6, and therefore void. Chief Jus
tice. MARSHALL, in delivering the opinion of the Court, says:
" Every requisite to the formation of a contract is found in the
proceedings between the then colony of New Jersey and the
Indians. The subject was a purchase on the part of the governinent' of extension 'claims of the Indians, the extinguishment of
which would quiet the title to a large portion of the province. A
proposition to this effect is made, the terms stipulated, the consideration agreed upon, which is a tract of- land, with the privi.
lege of exemption from taxation; and then,.in consideration of
the arrangement previously made, one of which this Act of"
Assembly is stated to be, the Indians execute their deed of cession. This is certainly a contract clothed in forms of unusual
solemnity. "Th6 question to be considered was, did the legislature pass the act exempting the lands from taxation as an ordinary
law, or was it a contract between the parties. It- certainly possessed every element of a contract between parties, making a
mutual agreement. But had the Inalians parted from nothing,
and the legislature enacted simply that their lands should be
exempt from taxation, would it have constituted a contract ? And
could not a subsequent legislature have. repealed the statute and
imposed a tax upon the lands? ' I'think nothing could be plainer;
the legislattire cannot by declaring an act perpetual render it s.o,
An act without any consideration passing between the parties
providing.that lands never should be taxed, would have only, the"
force and effect of an ordinary law, simply exempting them from
taxation, which might be repealed by any subsequent legislature."
The case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518,
is a leading case., and is usually cited as containing a most full
and elaborate discussion of the principles, contended for in this
case. In the investigation of the Dartmouth College case, the
inhibition on the state tW impair by law the obligations of contracts received the most thorough and exhaustive examination;
and the great influence of the authoritative adjudication then
made has remained unimpaired to the present day. Dartmouth
College was incorporated by the King of Great Britain in 1769
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The Legislature of New Hampshire, by Act of Assembly, undertouk to vary the charter in essential points; to institute a number
of additional visitors, and in fact to exercise complete control.
over it. MARSHALL, C. J., declares that the charter was a con.
tract, to which the donors, the trustees of the corporation, and
the crown, were the original parties, and it was made on a valuable consideration- for the security and disposition of the property.
The act of the state" there which was complained of, transferred
the whole power of governing the college friom the trustees
arpointed in accordance with the will of the original founder, as
expressed -in the charter; to the Convention of New Hampshire.
Th "charter was rebrganized so as to entirely wrest the corporation from the management and control of the trustees appointed
according to the will of -the original founders, and converted into
a machine wholly subservient to the state government. This, of
course, was entirely subversive of the contract under which the
donors acquired their propefty.
. In Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 183, it was held that
when the legislature of a state accepted from banking corporations
a bonus as a consideration for.the franchise granted, and pledged
the faith of the state not to impose taxes upon them, during the continuance of their charters under the .act, that a tax upon the stockholders by-reason of their stock, was a violation of the contract,
and illegal. The same point was ruled in the cases growing out
of the laws of Ohio, creating their bankind system.
In 1845 the legislature of Ohio passed a general banking law,
the 59th section of which required the officers to make semiannual dividends, and the 60th required them to set off six per
cent. of such dividends for the use of the state, which sum or
amount, so set off, should be in lieu of all taxes to which the company, or the stockholders therein, would otherwise be subject.
In 1851 an act was passed entitled " An act to tax banks, and
bank and other stocks, the same as property is now taxable .by the
laws of the state." The operation of the latter law was to
increase the tax. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the. law
and declared in favor of its validity, but the Supreme Court of
the United States reversed the decision* of the state court, on the
ground that the first law was a contract founded on a consideration, and that it could not be violated: .Piqua Braneh of the
State Barl of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 365 ; Dodge v. Woolsey,
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18 How. 331. The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to follow the
above decision, and the question was again brought before the
national tribunal, where the prior rulings were affirmed, and it
was distinctly announced that a state in chartering a corporation
might, in express terms, and fdr a consideration, contract that the
corporation should be exempt from taxation, and that a contract
so iade was protected from the subsequent legislation : Jefferson
Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436.
In all the cases decided by the Supreuie Court of the United
States, from the very earliest period down to the recent decisions
of Bridge Prop. v. Hoboken, 1 Wall. 116, and The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Id. 52, it is believed a valid consideration was
paid in every instance, in which we find judgments of that-court
invalidating a law of a state intended to abrogate a right vested
under a previous statute. The right of taxation, like the right
of eminent domain, is a prerogative of sovereignty, and ought never
to be surrendered. "That the taxing power. is of vital importance," said Chief Justice MARSHALL, in the case of The Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters 561-2, "that it is essential to
the existence of government are truths which it cannot be necessary to reaffirm. They are acknowledged and asserted by all.
It would seem that the relinquishment of such a power is never
to be assumed. We will not say that a state may not relinquish
it, that a consideration sufficiently reliable to induce a partial
release of it may not exist; but as the whole community is interested in retaining it undiminished, that community has a right to
insist that its abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in
which the deliberate purpose of the state to abandon it does not
appear." And, again :."The power of legislation, and consequently of taxation, operates on all .persons and property belonging to the body politic. This is an original principle which has
its foundation in society itself. It is granted by all for the benefib
of all. It resides in government as a part of itself, and neel not
be reserved when property of any description, or the right to use
't in any manner, is gr.anted to individuals or corporate bodies.
However absolute the right of an individual may be, it is still 'ir
she nature of that right that it must bear a portion of the.public
burdens, and that portion must be determined by the legislature."
In Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 139, the court denies, absolutely, that the state, acting through its legislature, can surrender
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any portion of the taxing power. The judge remarks:. " The
p'ower of taxation is essentially a power of sovereignty or eminent
domain; and it may well deserve consideration, whether this
power is not inherent in the people, under a republican government, and so far inalienable that no legislature can make a contract by which it can be surrendered without express authority
for that purpose in the Constitution, or in some other way leading
directly from the pebple themselves." This case was referred to
and received the unqualified assent of Mr. Justice DANIELS, in
-his dissenting opinion in The Piqua Branch, .c.,v. Knoop.
Prof. GREENLEAF, under the head of" .Franchise,'"
in his edition
of- Cruise, notices-the case of Brewster v. Hiough, and observes:
"In regard to the position that the grant of the franchise of a
ferry bridge, turnpike or railroad, is in its nature exclusive, so
that the state cannot interfere with it by the creation of another
similar franchise, tending materially to -impair its value ; it is
with great deference submitted that an impoitauit distinction should
be observed between those powers of government which are essential attributes of sovereignty indispensable to be always preserved
infull vigor. Such is the power to create revenue for public
purposes, to provide for the common defence, to provide safe and
convenient ways for the public necessity and convenience, and to
take private property for public uses and the like; and those
powers which are not thus essential, such as the power to alienate
the fands and other property of the state, and to make contracts'
of service or of purchase and sale, or -the like. Pow~ers of the
former class are essential to the constitution -of society, as without them no political community can well exist, and necessity
requires that they should continue unimpaired. They are intrusted
to the legislature to be exercised, not to be bartered away, and it is
essential that each legislature should assemble with the same measure of sovereign power which was held by its predecessor. Any
act of the legislature disabling itself from the exercise of powers
intrusted to it for the public good must be void, being in effect a
consent to desert its paramount duty to the whole people: 3
Greenleaf, Cruise, tit. 27, § 29, note.
It is an admitted principle, in our republican governments, that
our legislature cannot, in any manner, abridge or lessen the
power of a succeeding legislature. Each is alike invested with
the general powers of sovereignty. Therefore, one legislature
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cannot pass a law irrevocable or irrepealable in its character,
unless it has imparted to it something in the nature of a compact
or contract, which will presume it inviolate under the institutions
of the national Constitution. A law which seeks to deprive the
legislature of this inherent and.vital principle of sovereignty, the
power of taxation, must be so clear, explicit, and determinate, that
ther6 can be~neither doubt nor controversy about its terms, or the
consideration which renders it binding. Every presumption will
be made against its surrender, as the power was comuiitted by the
people to the government to be exercised and not to be alienated:
The People v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629 ; Mott et al. v. The Pennsyl
vania Railroad Co., 6 Casey 9 ; Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass.
442.
Because the legislature sees fit to grant certain privileges and
immunities to a person, it does not follow that they are to be perpetual, and that the law cannot be repealed. The legislative
power may enact'that an informer shall have a certain interest in
a penalty ; yet, after information given, the law may be repealed,
and his interest will be destroyed: 10 Wheat. 248 ; 6 Peters 404.
The legislature may, if there is no prohibition in the organic law
to the contrary, except certain species of propery- from taxation,
yet they would be at liberty at any time to repeal the exception,
and again subject it to the burdens of government. This, however, ought not to be questioned or doubted. But the opinion
seems to prevail with some minds that the right of property-is
more sacred in chartered corporations than the same right is in
the person of the citizin; a doctrine which I regard. as wholly
fallacious and indefensible. It is a notable fact 'that in earlier
days the courts were strongly in favor of corporations, and the
reason wag obvious: they were few; a strong prejudice existed
against them ; the legislatures were constantly encroaching upon
them. and they required protection.' Now, the reverse is true.
They have become so-numerous and powerful that they overshadow
almost everything in the land; nearly every one is some way
interested in them, and the legislature ne'eds protection against
their exactions, demands, and importunities. Had the grant ex.
empting the property of the defendant in error from taxation'been
made to an individual in the same terms, I do not think ii would
be for a moment contended that the grant was not repealable, and
that the state did not possess the unquestionable right to resume
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thetaxing power at pleasure. Can it make any difference because
it was made to a corporation ? It seems to me that the case of
Christ Church v. Philadelphia,24 How. U. S. 3002 is entirely
similar in principle to the case at bar, and conclusive authority,
where it was held that an exemption from taxation contained in
the charter of a corporation granted by the state, was in nature
durante bene placito, and revocable by Subsequent act.
It appears, from the report, that in the year 188a the legislature of Pefinsylvania passed an act which recited "that Christ,
Church Hospital, in the city of Philadelphia, had for many years
afforded an asylum to-numerous poor and distressed widows, who
would probably else have become a public charge; and-it being represented that in consequence of the decay of the buildings of the
hospital estate, and the increasing burden of taxes, its means were
curtailed and its usefulness limited," they enacted: "1That the real
property, including ground-rents, now belonging and payable to
Christ Church Hospital, in- the city of Philadelphia, so long as
the same shall continue to the said hospital, shall be and remain
free fr9m taxes."
In the year 1851 the same authority enacted "that all property,
real and personal, belonging to any association or incorporated
.company which is now by law exempt fr9m taxation, other than
that which is in the actual use and occupation of such association
or incorporate.d company from which the income or reventie ia
deriVed by the owners thereof, shall be hereafter subject to taxa-tion in the same manner and for the same purposes as other property is now by law taxable; and so much -ot the law'as is hereby
It
altered and supplied, be and the same is hereby repealed." ..
was decided in the Supreme Court of P.ennsylvania that the ."
exemption conferred -upon the plaintiffs by the Act of 1833 was
partially repealed by the Act of 1851; and that an assessment of
a portion of the real property under the Act 6f 1851 was nnt
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States as tending to
impair a legislative 'contract alleged to be contained in the Act .of
Assembly of 1833. The Supreme Court of the United States says.
"The plaintiffs claim that the exemption conceded by the Act of
1833 is perpetual, and that the act itself is in effect a contract.
This concession of the legislature was spontaneous, and no service
or duty or other remunerative condition was imposed on the corporation. It belongs to the class of laws denominated privilegi
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favorabilia. It attached only to such real property as belonged
to the corporation, and while it remained as its property ; but it
is not a necessary implication from these facts that the concession
is perpetual, or was designed to continue during the corporate
existence."
And it is further added: "It is in the nature of
such a privilege as the Act of 1833 confers, that it exists bene
placitum, and may be revoked at the pleasure of the sovereign."
This decision was made by an unanimous bench, subsequent to the
Ohio cases, in which three judges disented, and shows most
clearly that a grant of the nature of the one we are now considering was not regarded in the light of a contract.
No importance or weight can, be attached to that provision of
defendant in error's charter, which excludes it from the operation
of the 11th section of the general law in relation to corporations.
It is incompetent, as before observed, for-one legislatureto attempt
to derogate from the power, or to tie up the hands of a subsequent
legislature. For an irrepealable contract, of the character here
presented, no authority or precedent is to be found. Whilst the
exemption continued the property was free from taxation, but
when the law was repealed it then fell back in the general mass,
liable like all other property for the burdens of government. It
has been truly said that, "in a representative democracy, the
right of taxing the citizen is an inseparable incident of popular
sovereignty." And this right must be preserved unimpaired, in
order that the revenue and burdens necessary to support the
government be not unequally distributed or onerously imposed on
any particular class. -The rights and obligations of the citizen
and the government are mutual and correlative ; the one owes the
duty of allegiance-the other of protection. Whilst protection is
held out and extended, the necessary support for the government
must be furnished. Giving away "the taxing power in perpetuity
inevitably leads to the destruction of the state. If ten millions
can be released in one day, one hundred millions may be released
in another, and the principle being once established, the process
might go on till every resource of revenu6 was gone. Airhough
the taxing power is but an incidental one, to be exercised as.the
means of performing governmental functions, it is nevertheless
a branch of the legislative power wvhich always, in its nature,
implies not only the power of making laws, but of altering and
repealing them, as the exigencies of the state and circumstances
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of the times may require: Rutherford's Institutes of Natural Itaw,
book 3,ch. 3, § 3.
When the charter of the University was granted, the legislature
might have considered it reasonable to foster and encourage it in
its infancy, and confer upon it privileges and immunities while
struggling into existence. But no provision is made either in
express terms, or by reasonable intendment, that those immunities
should be perpetual,.and have the effect of withdrawing millions
of subsequently acquired property from taxation.
In 1853 taxes were light, and the .state debt was small, and
exceptions could be made without great detriment. After that
period the state embarked in a false and ruinous system of loaning its credit to corporations, by which she incurred an immense'
debt; then followed the civil war which increased her already
burdensome obligations, and taxation became exceedingly onerous.
In this condition of things it was deemed.the part of wvisdom to
make all property within the jurisdiction of the s'tate, receiving
the beifefit of her law and protection, share the common burthens.
This was entirely a matter resting in the sound discretion of the
legislative branch of the.government, and we have been unable to
find any objection to their exercise of the power.
The other judges concurred.
Judgment reversed, and petition dismissed.
The legislature*6f a state has no power
to impair the obligation of contracts. It
has no power to divest the state by contract, or otherwise, of the sovereign right
to tax property within its jurisdiction.
Why cannot these two propositions
stand together ?
The second one is not in conflict with
the first. It simply negatives the right,
in a legislature, to make any of the attributes of sovereignty the subject of contract or barter. They are inherent in
the state, and necessary conditions of its
existence. Every one is bound to know
$his, and therefore no one can be deceived
in acting upon the faith of a contract,
which assumes to make the sale of these
attribites the subject-matter of its terms.
Unfortunately the Supreme Court of
the United States has taken a different
VoL. XV.-26

view of the question. In Gordon -v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133 f Piqua
Branch of the State of Ohio v: Knoop, 16
How. 369 ; .lodqe v. Woolseyj, 18 How.
331 ; and Jefferson Branch Bank v.
Skelly, 1 Black U. S. 436, that learnid
tribunal has *settled down upon a series
of decisions, which it would be difficult
upon any well defined principle to sustain. It seems to be conceded in these
decisions, that a legislature would not
have the power to divest the state of its
sovereign right of taxation as.to all the
property within its jurisdiction; while a
surrender of that right as to a portion of
such property is repeatedly approved.
The extent to which such surrender may
be carried, is not indicated, nor is it possible to perceive any limit which could
afford the basis of a rule for the judiciary,
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3hort of a total denial of the power. It
is on this accoun. we are inclined to say,
that the question is not settled upon principle. It hangs between a total and a
partial surrender of an essential attribute of sovereignty, withholding the
former and conceding the latter. By
adopting an unqualified denial of this
right of surrender in all cases, we would
find the question settled upon principle,
and all litigation and doubt upon the
subject would be at an end.
-As it now stands, litigation will. have
to go on in restless obedience to a series
of decisions which have nothing but
their authority to commend them to the
state courts. Cases will continually
rise, in which the right to exempt from
taxation will be contested ; and in the
differing facts of eftch case, will be
sought soine distinguishing element, by
which to .escalie the authority of the
Federal decisions.
In the present case, the couirt, while
evidently yielding reluctant assent to
their authority in establishing the doctrine that a state may part with its soverdign right of. taxation, maintains a distinction which must commend itself to
every mind. That distinction rests upon
the fact that the grant of exemption from
taxation in this case was without consideration, and therefore fell within the
class of privileges, which could be withdrawn at any time. As an executory

obligation, the consideration upon which
it rested was too shadowy to support the
conclusion that it was to be continued
against the sovereign will.
Yet it may be doubted whether the
consideration implied in this charter
would not have been sufficient to support
the grant or concession of anything else
but an attribute of sovereignty. It is
true the right of taxation is the subject
of grant or surrender under the Federal
decisions, but not exactly in the same
manner as land and money. The contract of surrender must be clear in every
element requisite to its existence. Neither the consideration nor obligation can
be left to implications.
The charter in this-case was singularly
defective in failing to disclose the essential elements of a contract. No consideration was expressed. There is no
return for the grant-no corresponding
obligation on the part of the university
to devote its funds and franchises to the
cause of education, except what is implied in the word 1,seminary."
All'who are inclined to the view that
a legislature has no power, even for a
sufficient consideration, to part with the
right of taxation, will yield a cheerful
assent to .the distinction maintained in
this case, where the consideration for the
surrender is found, if at all, in doubtful
and uncertain implications.
A.M.
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Under the general issue in assumpsit, evidence is admissible to show that the
alleged cause of action did not exist at the commencement of the action.
A note given by partners is not a joint and several obligation in a technical
ense, though it has some of the qualities of a several obligation.
Therefore a judgment upon a partnership note against one of the makers is at
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common law a bar to a subsequent suit against the other partner who had not lIeen
served with process in the first suit.
But in Michigan the rule is otherwise by statute.
The case of Sheeqy v. Mandeville et al., 6 Cranch 254, criticised and dissented
from.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
FiELD, J.-This case comes before us on a certificate of division
of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the District of Wisconsin. The action is assumpsit upon the promissory
note of the defendants, made by them as partners. Process was
served upon the defendant, Anson Eldred, who appeared and
pleaded the general issue. Neither of the other defendants was
served with process, or appeared to the action. On the trial the
plaintiff produced and read in evidence the note without objection,
ani rested. The defendant served, then produced, and offered
to read in evidence, an exemplification of a record of a jtidgment
recovered by the plaintiff upon the. same note in an action against
the same defendants in a court of the State of Michigan. The
judgment was, in form, against all of the defendants, but the record
showed that the process in the action had been served only on
one of them, Elisha Eldred. - To the introduction of this record
objection was made, upon which the question arose whether the
record was admissible in evidence under the'issue, in bar of the
plaintiffs' recoyery against Anson Eldred. Upon this question
the judges were opposed in opinion.
The counsel of the pliintiff suggests. that the question thus
presented is divisible into two parts: 1st. Whether' the record
was admissible under the pleadings; and, 2d. Whether, if admissible, the judgment constituted a bar to the present action. We
think, however, that the admissibility of the record depends upon
the operation, of the judgment. If the note in suit was merged
in the judgment, then the judgment is a bar to' the action, and
an exemplification of its record is admissible, for it has long been
settled that under the plea of the general issue in assumpsit evidence may be received to show, not merely tha the alleged
cause of action never existed, but also to show that it did not
subsist at the commencement of the suit: Young v. Black,
7 Cranch 565; Young v. Bummell, 2 Hill 480. On the otber
hand, if the note is not thus merged, it still forms a subsisting
cause of action, and the judgment is immaterial and irrelevant.
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The question then for determination relates to the operation
of the judgment upon the note in suit.
The plaintiff contends that a copartnership note is the several
obligation of each copartner, as well as the joint obligation of
all, and that a judgment recovered upon the note against one
copartner is not a bar to a suit upon the same note against another
copartner ; and the latter position is insisted upon as the rule of
the common law, independent of the Joint-Debtor Act of Michigan.
It is true that each copartner is bound for the entire amount
due on copartnership contracts ; and that this obligation is so far
several that if he is sued alone, and. does not plead the non-joinder
of his copartners, a recovery may be had against him for the
whole amount due upon the contract, and a joint judgment against
the copartners may be enforced against the property of each.
But this is a different thing from the liability which arises from
a joint and several contract. There the contract contains distinct engagements, that of each contractor individually, and that
of all jointly, and different remedies may be pursued upon each.
The contractors may be sued separately on their several engagements or together on their joint undertaking. But in copartnerships there is no such several liability of the copartners. The
copartnerships are formed for joint purposes.
The members
undertake joint enterprises, they assume joint risks, and they
incur in all cases joint liabilities. In all copartnership transactions this common risk and liability exist. Therefore it is that
in suits upon these transactions all the copartners must be brought
in, except when there is some ground of personal release from
liability, as infancy or a discharge in bankruptcy ; and if not
brought in, the omission may be pleaded in abatement. The plea
in abatement avers that the alleged promises, upon which the
ction is brought, were made jointly with another. and not with
the defendant alone, a plea which would be without meaning, if
the copartnership contract was th; several contract of each
copartner.
The language of Lord MANSFIELD, in giving the judgment of
the King's Bench in Rice v. Shute, Burr. 2511, "that all contracts with partners are joint and several, and every partner is
liable to pay the whole," must be read in connection with the
facts of the case, and when thus read does not warrant the ,onelusion that the court intended to hold a copartnership contract
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the several contract of each copartner, as well as the joint contract of all the copartners, in the sense in which these terms are
understood by the plaintiff's counsel, but only that the obligation
of each copartner was so far several, that in a suit against him
judgient would pass for the whole demand, if the non-joinder of
his copartners was not pleaded in abatement..
The plea itself, which, as the court decided, must be interposed
in such cases, is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a several
liability.
. For the support of the second positioti, that a judgment
against
one copartner on a copartnership note does not constitute a bar
to a'suit upon the same note against another copartner, the plaintiff relies upon the case of Sheehy v. Mandeville and Jamesson,
decided by this court, and reported in 6 Cranch 254. In that
case the plaintiff brought a suit upon a promissory note given by
Jamesson for a-copartnership debt of himself and Mindevile.' A
previous suit had been brought upoh the same note against Jamesson alone, and .judgment recovered. To the second suit against
the two"copartners the judgment in the first action was pleaded
by the defendant, Mandeville,.and the court .held that it constituted no bar to the second action, and sustained a demurrer to
the plea..
The decision in this case has 'never received the entire appro
bation of the profession, and its correctness has been doubted,
and its authority disregarded in numerous instances by the highest
tribuna'ls of different states. It was elaborately reviewed by the
Supreme Court of New York in the case of.Robertson v. Smith,
18 Johns. 459, where its reasoning was declared unsatisfactory,
and a judgment rendered in direct conflict with its adjudication.
In the Supreme Court of Massachusetts a ruling similar to that
of Robertson v. Smith was made: Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 148.
In Wann v. McNulty, 2 Gilman 359, the Supreme Court of Illinois commented upon the case of Sheehy v. Mandeville, and
declined to follow it as authority. The court observed that notwithstanding the respect which it felt for the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, it was well satisfied that the
rule adopted by the several state courts--referring to those of
New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Indiana-was more
consistent with the principles of law, and was supported by better
reasons.
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In Smith v. Black, 9 S.& R. 142, the Supreme Court of Penn.
sylvania held that a judgment recovered- against one of two part.
ners was a bar to a subsequent suit against both, though the new
defendant was a dormant partner at the time of the contract, and
was not discovered until after the judgment. "No principle,"
said the court, " is better settled than that a judgment once rendered absorbs and merges the whole cause of action, and that
neither the matter nor the parties can be severed, unless, indeed,
-where the cause of action is joint and several, which, certainly,
actions against partners are not."
In its opinion the court referred to Sheehy v. Handeville, and
remarked that the decision in that case, howev6r much entitled to
respect from the character of the judges who composed the Supreme Court of the United States, was not of binding authority,
and it was disregarded.
In King v. ifoar, 13 M. & W. 495, the question whether a
judgment iecovered against one of two joint contractors was a
bar to an action agaiiist the other, was presented to the Court of
Exchequer, and was elaborately considered. The principal authorities were reviewed, and the conclusion reached that, by
the judgment recovered, the original-demand had passed in rent
judicatan, and could not be made the subject of another action.
In the course of the argument the case of Sheehy] v. Mandeville
was referred to as opposed to the conclusion reached, and" the
court observed that it had the greatest respect for any decision
of Chief Justice MARS'IALL, but that the reasoning attributed to
him in the report of that case was not satisfactory. Mr. Justice
SToRy, in Trafton v. The -United Stztes, 8 Story 651, refers to.
this case in the Exchequer, and to that of Sheehy v. Mandeville,
and observes that in the first case the Court of Exchequer pronounced what seemed to him a very sound and satisfactory judgment, and as to the decision in: the latter case, that he had for
years entertained great doubts of its propriety.
The general doctrine maintained in England -and the United
States may be briefly stated. A judgment against one upon &
joint contract of several persons, bars an action against the.others,
though the latter were dormant partners of- the defendant in the
original action, and this fact was unknown to the plaintiff when
that action was commenced. When the contract is joiflt, and
not joint and several, the entire cause of action is merged in the
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judgment. -The joint liatiity of the*parties not sued with those
against whom the judgment is recovered, being extinguished,
their entire liability is gone. They cannot be sued separately, for
they have incurred no several obligation ; they cannot.be sued
jointly with the others, because judgment has been already recovered against the latter, who would otherwise be subjected to
two suits for the same cause.
If, therefore, the common-law rule were to govern the decision
of this case, we should feel obliged, notwithstanding Sheehy v.
-Mandeville,to hold that the promissory note was merged in the
judgment of the court of Michigan, and that the judgment would
be'a bar to the p1iesent action. But, by a statute of that state,,
the rule of the common law is changed with respect to judgments
upon demands of joint debtors, when some only of the parties are
served with process. The statute enacts that 1 in actions against
two or more persons jointly indebted upon any joint obligation,
contract, or liability, if the process against all of the defendants
shall have been duly served upon either of them, the defendant
so served shall answer to the plaintiff, and in such case the judgment, if rendered in favor of the plaintiff, shall be against all
the defendants in the same manner'as if all had been served with
process," and that "such judgment shall be. conclusive evidence
of the liabilities of the defendant who was served with process in
the ,uit, or w-ho appeared therein; but against every other defendant it shall be evidence 'only of the extent of the plaintiff's
demand, after the liability of such difendant shall have been
established by other evidence :" Compiled'Laws of Michigan of
1857, vol. II., chap. 133, p. 1219.
Judgments in cases of this kind against the parties not served
with process, or who 'do not appear therein, have no binding force
upon them, personally. - The principle is as old as the law, and
is of universal justice, that no one shall be personally bound until
he has had his day in court, which means until citation is 5issued
to him, and opportunity to be heard is afforded: )D'Areyv.
.Ketchum, 1 How. 165. Nor is the demand against the parties
not sued merged in the judgment against the party brought into
court. The statute declares what the effect of the judgment
against him shall be with respect to them; it shall only be evidence of the extent of the plaintiff's demand after their liability
is by other evidence established. It is entirely within the power
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of the state to limit the operation of the judgment thus recovered.
The state can as well modify the consequences of a judgment in
respect to its effect as a merger and extinguishment of the original
demand, as it can modify the operation of the judgment in any
other particular.
A similar stattite exists in the state of New York, and the
highest tribunals of New York and Michigan, in construing
these statutes, have held, notwithstanding :the special proceedings
which they authorize against the parties not served to bring them
afterwards before the court, if found within the state, that such
parties may be sued upon the original demand.
In Bonesteel v. Todd, 9 Michigan 879, an action of covenant
was brought against two parties to recover rent reserved upon a
lease. One of them was alone served with process, and he appeared and pleaded the general issue, and on the trial, as in the
case at bar, produced the record of a judgment recovered against
himself and his co-defendant under the Joint Debtor Act of New
York, process in that state having been served upon his co-defendant alone. The court below held the judgment to be a bar to the
action. On- error to the Supreme Court of the state this ruling
was held to be erroneous. After referring to decisions in New
York, the Court said, "no one. has ever doubted the continuing
liability of all parties. We cannot, therefore, regard the liability
as extinguished. And, inasmuch as the new action must be based.
upon the original claim, while, as in the case of foreign judgments at common law, it may be of no great importance whether
the action may be brought in form upon the judgment, or on the
previous debt, it is certainly more in harmony with our. practice
to resort to the fofm of "actionappropriate to the real demand in
controversy. While we do not decide an action in form on the
judgment to be inadmissible, we think the action bn the contract
the better remedy to be pursued."
In- Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 Comstock 513, the Court of Appeals
of New York had occasion to consider the effect of a judgment recovered under the Joifnt Debtor Act of that state upon the original
demand. Mr. Justice BioNsON, speaking for the court, says:
"It is said that the original demand was merged in and extinguished by the judgment, and consequently that the plaintiff must
sue upon the judgment, if he sues at all. That would undoubtedly
be so if both the defendants had been before the court in the
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original action. But the Joint Debtor Act creates an anomaly
in the law. And for the purpose of giving effect to the statute,
and at the samte time preserving the rights of all parties, the
plaintiff must be allowed to sue on the original demand. There
is no difliculty in pursuing such a course: it can work no injury
to any one, and it will avoid the absurdity of allowing a party to
sue on a pretended cause of action, which is, in truth, no cause
of action at all, and then to recover on proof of a different
demand."
Follow;ntg these authorities, and giving the judgment recovered
in Michigan the same effect and operation that it would have in
that state, we answer the question presented in the certificate,
that the exemplification of the record of the judgment recovered
against the defendant, Elisha Eldred, offered by the defendant,
Anson Eldred, is not admissible in evidence in bar of, and to
defeat, a remedy against him.

Supreme Court of the United States.
THE GALENA, &c., PACKET COMPANY v. So mucH OF THE ROCK

ISLAND RAILROAD BRIDGE
OF "ILLINOIS, THE

AS LIES WITHIN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT

ROCK ISLAND RAILROAD

COMPANY, THE

MISSISSIPPI AND MISSOURI RAILROAD COMPANY, CLAIMANTS.
A maritime lien does not exist upon a stationary structure like a bridge, and
therefore a Court of Admiralty has no jurisdiction of a proceeding in rem against %
bridge to recover damages caused by the structure to vessels navigating a public
stream.
Nature and extent of the admiralty jurisdiction in rem discussed by FIELD, J.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the,
Northern District of Illinois.

Robert Rae and A. W. Arrington, for libellants.
C. Becl with and B. C. Cook, for claimants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-The libel in this case is filed against that part
of the Rock Island Railroad Bridge, which is situated in the
Northern District of Illinois, for alleged damages done by that
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part of the bridge to two steamboats, the property of the libellant,
employed in the navigation of the Mississippi river. ft alleges
that, by law and the public treaties of the United States, the
Mississippi river is, for the distance of 2000 miles, a public
navigable stream and common -highway, free and open to all the
citizens of the United States, who are entitled to navigate the
same by sailing and steam vessels, and otherwise, without impediment or obstruction; that the Rock Island bridge obstructs the
free navigation of the stream; and that' by collision with this
obstruction the steam-vessels of the libellant have been injured,
and he has in consequence- been damaged to an extent exceeding
$70,000.
In accordance with the prayer of the libel, process was issued
and the property attached. The Mississippi and Missouri Rail.
road Company and others then intervened as claimants, and filed
an exception to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed against
the property in question in the manner "in which the same is
sought to be proceeded against by the libel"-in other words,
they objected to the jurisdiction of the court to take a proceeding
in rem against the property. The exception was sustained by
the District and Circuit Courts, and the libel dismissed. The
correctness of this ruling is the sole 'luestion presented for our
determination.
There is no doubt, as stated by the counsel for the appellant,
that the jurisdiction of the Admiralty extends to all-cases of tort
committed on the high seas, and in this country On navigable
waters. For the redress of these torts, the Courts of Admiralty
may proceed in persondm, and when the cause of the injury is the
subject of a maritinie lien, may also proceed in rem. The latter*
proceeding is the remedy afforded for the enforcement of liens of
that character.
A maritime lien, unlike a lien at common law, may, in many
cases, exist without possession of the thing, upon which it is
asserted, either actual or constructive. It Qonfers, however, upon
its holder such a right in the thing that he may subject it to con.
demnation and sale to satisfy his claim or damages: and when the
lien arises from torts committed at sea, it travels with the thing,
wherever that goes, and into whosesoever hands it may pass. The.
only object of the proceeding in rem is to make this right, where
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it exists, available-to carry it into effect.
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It subserves no other

purpose.
The lien and the proceeding in rem are therefore correlativewhere one exists the other can be taken, and not otherwise. Such
is the language of the Privy Council in the decision of the case
of The. Bold Buccleugh, 7 Moore 284. "1A maritime lien," says
that court, " is the foundation of the proceeding in rem, a process
to make perfect a right inchoate from the moment the lien attaches ; and whilst it must be admitted that where such lien exists
a proceeding in rem may be had, it will be found to be equally
true, that in all cases where a proceeding in rem is the proper
course, there a maritime lien exists, which gives a privilege or
claim upon the-thing to be carried into effect by legal process."
There is an expression in the case of The Volant, 1,W. Rob.
38, attributed to Dr.*LUSHNGTON, which militates against this
view. He is reported'to have said, that the damage committed on
the high seas confers no lien upon'the ship, and this is cited by
the counsel of the appellant to show that a maritime lien is not the
fonidation of a proceeding in rem. But the expression is a mere
dictum, and the Privy Council in the case cited allude to it, and
observe that it is doubtfUl, from a contemporaneous report of the
same case .(1 Notes of Cases 508),'whether the learned judge
made use of it, and add, that if he did, the expression is certainly
inaccurate, and not being necessary for the decision of the case,
cannot be taken as authority.
A maritime lien can only exist upon movable things engaged in
navigatidn, or upon things which are the subjects of commerce on
the high- seas or navigable waters. It may arise with reference
to vessels, steamers, and rafts, and upon gbods and merchandise
carried by them. But it cannot arise upon anything which is
fixed and immovable, like a wharf, a bridge, or real estate of any
kind. Though bridges and wharves may aid commerce by facilitating intercourse on land, or the discharge of cargoes, they are
not in any sense the subjects of maritime lien.
Decree affirmed.

RHODES v. DUNBAR.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
WILLIAM A. RHODES

ET AL. V.

ELON DUNBAR

ET AL.

The objection to a factory or other building in a city that it will prevent the uso
of the neighboring ground for such buiildings as would, in the ordinary course ol
afflairs and the extension of the city, be erected there, is not a ground for- interf6rence by a court of equity. The subject presented by such objection is one of public
policy, not'of private right, with which courts deal.
A court of equity will not interfere with a particullar use of a building or lot of
ground unless it amounts to a nuisance at law for which damages might be recovered,
and for which damages merely would not be an adequate remedy.
- Mere diminution of value of surrounding property is not a ground for injunction.
Smoke, noise, and liability to fire as elements of nuisance in a city, discussed by
THOMPSON, C. J.

BILL in equity to enjoin the erection of a planing-mill. Injunction granted at Nisi .Prius,whereupon respondents appealed.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
THOMPSON, C. J.-The plaintiffs, by their bill, seek to enjoin
the defendants from re-erecting or reconstructing a planing-mill,
late the property of John D. Jones, situated on the east side of
Twenty-first street, between Chestnut and Market'streets, which*
,Was destroyed by fire "inthe month of May 1867.. It is claimed
that if re-erected, it will be a nuisance to the property and dwellings of the complainants, impairing their value, and rendering
the enjoyment of them uncomfortable and unsafe; and this, it is
alleged, will flow from three causes, incidents to the structure and
its intended use, if it be permitted to go into operation, viz.: 1st.
Smoke, soot, and dust. 2d. Noise. And 3d. Danger trom fire.
The general averment ii the bill-that the mode in which such a
factory or-mill is worked renders it unsuited to a neighborhood
closely built up, and especially to one occupied by handsome
buildings used as residences, and will be calculated to prevent the
use of the neighboring ground " for such buildings as would in
the ordinary course of affairs, and the extension of the city in
a subject
that direction, be put.up"-presents for consideration
not within our sphere' of judicial action. It presents a .ques!
tion of policy, whether a part or portion of a city is or ought to
be devoted exclusively to private residences or other special
objects, and that is manifestly for the local authorities or the
legislature to determine, and not us. That .concerns alone the
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public, and not private parties. With people's rights we deal'in
cases like the present, and not with questions of mere p6licy,
local or general.
No one will, for a moment, doi.bt that we are invested with
ample powers to restrain the erecti, n of any building or structure
intended for a purpose which will 1:e a nuisance per se; such as
bone-boiling, horse-boiling establishments, swine-yards or pigsties, and other various like establishments.
These not only
interfere with the health, but if they do not reach to that, they
do to the usual and ordinary enjoyment of the residences of
inhabitants coming within the circ'e of atmosphere tainted by
them, and both property and persons may be prejudiced or
injured thereby
The right to claim that such establishments
shall be prevent .d is the right that every citizen has to pure and
wholesome air, -,t least as pure as it may be consistent with the
compact nature of the community in which he lives. The rule is
the same in regard to noises which disturb rest and prevent sleep.
There are innumerable cases of injunction for such nuisances.
But does th6 case in hand come within the classes to which
reference has be n made, in either of the specifications mentioned ?
1st. The smoke and soot complained of, I do not think have
been shown to have been a nuisance in the old mill for which
damages at law might have been recovered ;- and I know of no
other criterion. where the complaint is for injury to property and
its enjoyment. Irreparable injury is the foundation for intervention by injunction. No irreparable because so small that it may
not be estimated, but because likely to be so great as to be incapable of compensation in damages: Hilliard on Inj. 270, 271 and
272; 37 N. H. Rep. 254. There must be injury and damago
both, to justify the remedy by injunction: Campbell v. Scott,
11 Sim. 39. The complaint of the old mill, in this particular,
was on account mainly of the fuel, chips, shavings, and saw-dust
used; and that is the foundation of the complaint against the
contemplated re-erection.
If no other species of fuel ivould
answer the purpose, or could be used, I grant there might be more
in the point. But this is not pretended. If, therefore, when the
mill shall be put into operation, and by its use it becomes a nui.
sance from this cause, the remedy is easy and well known.
Equity will enjoin against the use of such fuel, and the mischief
will be at once cured. That a thing may possibly work injury
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to somebody is no ground for injunction. If the injury be doubtful, eventual, or contingent, equity will not interfere by injunction:
Butler v. Rogers, I Stock. (N. J.) 487; Hilliard 271. This
might be sufficient on this point, but it is quite possible that in the
construction of chimneys all objection to this kind of fuel may be
obviated. The answer of one of the defendants asserts this, and
that -it is so intended, and can be accomplished, and it is nowhere
controverted. Indeed, it seems evident that if the chimneys be
high enough, with proper netting at the top, that anything like annoyance amounting to a "sensible injury" to property, as was held
to be essential to enjoining .inTipping v. St. Helens Smelt. Co.,
5 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 104, 116 E. C. L. R. 608, may be entirely
avoided. Indeed, the learned master seemed in doubt whether
the element of smoke, soot and cinders, judged of by the old mill,
proved or would prove a material injury to property. Alluding
to these agencies, he says they "perhaps cannot, in a strict sense,
be said to have produced a material-that is a palpable, direct,
physical-injury to the plaintiff's property." But then he gives
reasons to show that it occasioned annoyance and discomfort, and,
therefore, concluded that a re-erection of the mill ought. to be
prevented fol this and other reasons. Annoyances without damage, I have already said, are no grounds for injunction. Shall
the owner of property be deprived of its free and profitable use
altogether, it may be, because the light and air .may not be as
pure as a neighbor might desire, or because a laundress may not
be able to dry the contents of the wash-tub quite as satisfactorily ?
-or a house-maid have to dust more frequently ? These are
annoyances referred to in the proof, but are incident to a city
residence ; and if people prefer living in a city, they can only'
do so on account of others desiring, to do the same thing in sufficient numbers to constitute a city, -and then each tacitly undertakes to suffer such annoyances or inconveniences as are incident
to that kind of community. This has been often expressed, but
is strikingly enforced by Lord Ch. WESTBURY, in Tipping Y. St.
Helens Smelt. Co., sura:'- If a man,"said the Chancellor,
"1live in a- town, of ibcessity he should submit himself to, the,
consequences of the obligations of trades which may be carried
on in-his immediate neighborhood, which are actually necessary
for trade and commerce, also for the enjoyment of property, and
for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town. If a man live in
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a street where there are numerous shops, and a shop is opened
next door to him, which is carried on in a fair and reasbuable
way, he has no ground of complaint because to himself, individually, there may arise much discomfort from the trade carried
on in that shop." Lord CRANWORTH, in the same case, puts it
thus :----"
You must look at it, not with a view to the question
whether abstractly that quantity of smoke Wvas a nuisance, but
whether it was a nuisance to the person living in the town." We
endeavored to express something like this in Sparlhawk v. Union
PassengerRailway, 4 P. F. Smith 401. It must be apparent to
all, we think, in regard to the intended structure, that the circumstances here do not establish a nuisance per se; and if it ever
amounts to that from the causes alleged in regard to the fuel, it is
within the powers of the Court to redress any injury by restraining the use of the objectionable fuel. It may be that none such
may be used, or, if used, that there may be an adaptation of
structure to prevent injurious consequences and annoyances.
Neither the facts nor precedent would, 4e think, justify us in
res.raining th&re-erection of the building on this ground. We
are, therefore, constrained to differ from our brother, who sustained the Master on this point, as well as on another, at Nisi
Prius."
2d. Noise.-'It is enough to say here that the Master was of
opinion, and.so found, that this "1was not sufficiently established
to afford a ground of relief to the plaintiffs." This conclusion.
was not much controverted in the argument before us, and we
think the Master was right in his conclusions on this point.
3d. Danger, or apprehension of danger; from fire, is the last
point to be noticed, and this seems to have been really the main
ground of decision in the mind of the Master, as well as of our
learned brother, in awarding an injunction.
What is apprehension? It is anticipation of danger, not a
certainty that it will occur. It may be felt as well when .danger
is infinitely remote as when it is near; as well when it may
never occur as when it may. It is, in regard to fire, " speculative, eventual, and contingent," and the books say this is never a
ground for interference by injunction: Barl of Ripon v. Hobe.rt,
3 Mylne & Keene 169. The apprehension of danger must on the
theory of this case, at least, be very remote, viz -.that the mill when
erected may take fire by negligence, accident, or by the work of
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an incendiary ; that the fire may not be extinguished, and that it
may be communicated to and burn the .property of the plaintiffs
and endanger their lives. Every element in all this is "speculative, contingent, and eventual." The mill might take fire', but
the flames may be extinguished. It might be burned down with
out-destroying the property of anybody else. It would be a waste
of time, I think, to labor to prove what every one must assent to
-that this, as a ground to exercise the power to prevent the
occupation and enjoyment of property - would be extremely
intangible, and once established as to this kind of mill, might be
applied to every other building or business in the community,
described in fire risks, or known as extra hazardous, and not only
planing-mills, but chemical laboratories, carpenter-shops, cottonmills, barns, stables, in short, everything that there might be
ground to apprehend danger of fire from, would gradually fall
into the vortex of chancery power, and might be banished the
city altogether, to the great inconvenience of the people. There
is odanger in all sucl establishments, it is true, and the same
argument would apply -to many others. The degree of danger
would be thWe only difference.
In Anonymous, 3 Atk. 750, Lord HA-RDWICKE said: " Bills
to restrain nuisances must extend only to such as are nuisances
at law, and the fears of mankind, though thqey be reasonable,
will not create a nuisance." That rule was held and acquiesced
in in the case of Carpenter v. Cummings, 3 Phila. Rep. 74.
That was a billto restrain the defendant from maintaining a boiler
to propel steam machinery under the pavement of a public street
and thoroughfare. The nuisance charged was the fear of- danger
to the complainant" and others, that it might explode 'and destroy
their property and lives. The ihjunction was refused, on the
authority of the case mentioned above, citing also 18 Yes 219,
and was, it would appear, acquiesced in hy the parties and counsel. - Butler v. Bogers, 1 Stockt. 487, was an attempt to restrain
a blacksmith shop. WILLIAMSON, Oh., said: "as a general rule
the Court ought not to interfere in cases of nuisances, where the
injury apprehended is of a character to justify conflicting opinions, whether the injury will, in fact, be ever realized."
If it be true that the act complained of must be a nuisance at
law, as held in 3 Atk. 750, supra, and sanctioned in Sparhawk v.
The Uniom Passenger Bailway Company, supra, this test would
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settle the controversy in this case at once. No action can be found.
I think, in wnich mere apprehension of fire from the use of property by one has been held a ground to recover damages by
another on the possibility that it might be communicated by the
former to the property of the latter.
But it is said that the rate of insurance upon the plaintiff's
mr,,iprty will be increased as a consequence 6f the re-erection of

I.,lS mill. If this fact had been found by the Master, itwould not
have established the point of nuisance. It is well known that theex:tince of extra hazardous property. in a neighborhood, while
it draws upon itself a heavier burden or rate of insurance, does
not usually involye special rates, in regard to proximate property belonging to a class with fixed rates. Rut it is stated very,
distinctly in Story's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 925, that mere
diminution in the val.ue of property, without irreparable mischief,
will not furnish any foundation for equitable relief.
In Attorney- eneral v.. Nichls, 16 Yes. 337, which was an
application for an injunction against darkening ancient lights,
Lord ELDON siid: "The foundation of this jurisdiction, interfering
by injunction, is that head of mischief alluded to by Lord HARDWIOKE (-Fishmongers' Company v. East India Company, 1 Dick.
164), that sort of material injury to the comfort of the existence
of those who dwell in the neighboring house; requiring the application of a power to prevent, as well as to remedy an evir for
which damages more or less would be, given in an action at law.
* * * * I repeat tlhe observation of Lord HARDWICKE, that
the diminution of the value of the premises is not a ground."'
That is to say, thelmere diminuiion, irregpective of any direct
damage, is not a ground for injunction. On this principle, the
diminution by reason of increase of insurance, if it really exists,
is no ground for the iuterferen6e sought.
Grant that the species of property in questior is extra hazardous, is subject to fires: this 'on the authority of all the cases
would not render- it a nuisance. It does riot necessarily affect
health or comfort in the ordinary uses and enjoyments of proper ty
in the neighborhood. If the business be lawful and carried on
reasonably, and does not interfere in either of those ways with
the rights of others, it cannot be a nuisance in fact or in anticipation, and in my opinion we have no authority whatever to interfere with it.
VOL. XVI-27
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These observati'ons give no just grounds to draw the inference
that a powder magazine or depot of nitro-glycerine, or other like
explosive materials, might not possibly be enjoined, even if not
prohibited, as they usually are, by ordinance or law. It is not on
the ground alone of their liability to fire, primarily, or even
secondarily, that they may possibly be dealt with as nuisances,
but on account of their liability to explosion by contact with the
smallest spark of fire, and the utter impossibility to guard against
the consequences or set bounds to the injury, which, being instantaneous, extends alike to property and person within its reach.
The destructiveness of these agents results fr6m the irrepressible
gases once set in motion, infinitely more than from fires which
might ensue as a consequence. Persons and -property in the
neighborhood of a burning building, let it burn ever so fiercely,
in most cases, have a chance of escaping injury. Not so when
explosive forces instantly.prostrate everything near 'them, as in
the instances of powder, nitro-glycerine, and other chemicals of an
explosive or intensely inflammable nature.
It is a difficult matter at all times to strike the true medium
between the conflicting'ifiterests and tastes of people in a densely
populated city. It requires the merchant, mechanic, maiufacturer, baker, butcher and laborer, as well as the wealthy employed
or unemployed citizen., to constitute a city. They all have rights,
and the only requirement of the law is, that each shall so exercise
and enjoy them as to do no injury in that enjoyment, to others,
or the rights of others, in the sense in which the .law regards injury, namely: accomlianied by damage. Jt might be a great
injury to the defendants in this case t6 restrain them from the
enjoyment of their property, without being of any benefit to the.
plaintiffs. " The ground' claimed in argument to sustain the decree
in this case was mainly ,the danger of fire. The proof is that
these are dangerous etablishments by comparison with others less
dangerous-but there is proof that ihey do not always burn, and
may never burn. In this state of the case, the language of Lord
BROUGHAM, in ihe Earl of Ripon v. Hobe;t, is worth a reference
here. "It is also," said. his Lordship, " very material to olJserve, what is indeed strong authority of a negative kind, that
no instance can be produced of the intervention by injunction, in
the case of what we have been regarding as eventual or contingent nuisances." We have said enough to indicate our -opinion
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that the fear of fire is of this description, and that this injunction should not have been granted originally, and therefore that
the decree must be reversed and bill dismissed.
Decree reversed and bill dismissed at the costs of the appelleen

United States District Court, District of New Jersey.
MATTER OF THE JERSEY CITY WINDOW GLASS COMPANY.
A stopping of payment of his commercial paper 1y a merchant or banker, in
order to constitute an dct of bankrnptcy under sect. 39 of the Bankrupt Act, must
be both fraudulent at first and be continud for fourteen days.
But a stoppage continued for fourteen days is primsfacie fraudulent, and casts
on the debtor the burden of proving his solvency.and that his stoppage will not
have the effect of.defrauding any creditor.
A petitioning creditor, -in proceedings for involuntary bankruptcy, not having
alleged that the debtor's stoppage for fourteen days was fraudulent, was allowed to
amend his- petition by adding that allegation.

THIs was a petition by Richard- B. Wigton, to have the Jersey
City Window Glass Company adjudged bankrupt.
J. ,F. Randolph, for the creditors..
J. Dixon, for the company;
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fina., J.-The only act of bankruptcy alleged in tbe petition
is, that the Jersey City Window Glass Company suspended payment of their commercial paper, and did not resume within- a
period of fourteen days. There is no allegation that this suspension and non-resumption were fraudulent. This, it is contended,
is an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the 39th section
of the Bankrupt Act. I am aware that this construction has been
sanctioned and adopted by the judges of several of the District
Courts. My attention has been more than once called to the
opinion of Judge HALL, of the Northern District of New York:
Matter of Tells & Son, ante 163; but with all my respect for
his learning and ability, I have never been able to bring my mind
to the conclusion which he has reached. The language of the
clause under consideration is: "Who, being a banker, merchant,
or trader, has fraudulently stopped or suspended, and not resumed
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payment of his commercial paper within a period of fourteen
days." It is insisted that here are two distinct acts of bankruptcy created and described; the first, a fraudulent stopping,
which is in itself an act of bankruptcy, and upon which proceedings may at once be instituted; and the second, a mere suspension of payment; without any fraud, and which only. becomes an
act of bankruptcy by being continued for a period of fourteen days.
It is possible, I admit, to read this clause in such a way as to
make it seem to bear such a constructicn. But it can only be
done by making a-distinct pause after the word "stopped," and
then reading in one breath the remaining part of the sentence. But is that the way in which any one would ever think
of reading it? Is it the naural and ordinary way? Would
not such a construction, to say the least, be a strained one ?
Would it not be doing violence to the language, and wresting
it from its 'obvious sense and meaning? And would it not
make the whole sentence not only a very awkward, but a 'very
ungrammatical one ? In this respect, it would be in striking
cofitrast with the rest of the act, in which, as it seems to me, much
more attention has been paid to clearness of expression, the corrqct use of language, and the rules of grammar, than is usual in
acts either of our national or state legislatures. But why depart
from the plain and obvious meaning of the language employed,
and resort to a construction so forced and unnatural ? For. the
purpose, it is said, of carrying out the general intentions of Congress in the passage of the Bankrupt Law. Now, it is very well
known that this law is in a great measure based upon the English
statutes of bankruptcy. Almost ev'ery act of bankruptcy enumerated in the 39th section, is to be found in the English statutes,where they are described in substantially the same terms. If,
then, the fraudulent stopping of pay~nent by a banker, merchant,
or trader of his commercial paper, and the suspension without
j.Fraud for a period of fourteen days were two~distinct and wellknown acts of bankruptcy.under the Engli~h law, we might natgrally expect to find them in our own act, and 'might very well
imagine'that we had found them in the clause referred to, althoiig*
certainly no very clearly expressed. But it so happens that
there are no such acts of bankruptcy known in the English law.
It is true, that by their bankrupt acts the suspension of payment
by a debtor is resolved into an act of bankruptcy, by summoning
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nim before the Court of Bankruptcy, and if such debt i, ii6t paid
or arranged to the satisfaction of the creditor within a prescribed
time, such non-payment or non-arrangement constitutes an act of
bankruptcy. But a fraudulent stopping alone, whether followed
by a resumption or not. is an act of bankruptcy never before
heard of. If, therefore, it was intended by -the framers of our
act to make this for the first time an act of bankruptcy, it might
be presumed that they would have declared their intention in clear
and unmistakable language. Certain it is, that we ought not to
wrest their language from its plain and obvious meaning in order
,o infer that th'ry had any such intention.
But what is meant by a fraudulent stopping ? Does it mean
that the ilebtor is unable to pay ; that he is insolvent ? If so, he
ought to stop. He has no right,-under those circumstances, to
xnay one creditor to tlie exclusion of another. This of itself would
be an act of bankruptcy. jIt must mean,.therefore, if it means
%nything,an unwillingness to pay, although he has the means of
ioing so. But suppose he pays the day after his commercial
paper arrives at maturity, would not that negative the idea of
fraud ? Must we not wait, therefore, to see whether payment is
resumed within a reasonable time, before we pronounce the original suspension to be fraudulent ? Undoubtedly the stopping
payment might be accompanied by circumstances which would
clearly indicatd a fraudulent purpose ; shch, for instance, as the
concealment or removal of property, or the fraudulent sale or
conveyance of it. ' But these would be in themselves' independent
acts of bankruptcy, upon which proceedings-might be instituted.
But how the mere act of suspension, if followed by resumption
within a few days, could be deemed frauduldnt I -do not very well
see. I do not believe, therefore, it was the intention of Congress
to make the stopping of payment, under any circumstances, an act of
bankruptcy in itself, and without reference to resumption. If the
debtor is perfectly solvent, and if he resumes payment within the
fourteen days, so that no one is defrauded, why should he be
adjudged a bankrupt?
What, then, is the true meaning and intent of the clause in
question ? I understand it to mean, according to the obvious
sense of the language made use of, that when a banker, merchant,
or trader fraudulently stops or suspends payment of his commercial paper, and does not resume within fourteen days, he commits
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an act of bankruptcy. To, constitute the act, there must be i
stopping or suspension of payment, and also a non-resumption
within fourteen days, and such suspension and non-resumption
must be fraudulent in the sense in which that term is here employed. If the debtor is able to pay, if.he has the means of
paying, and does riot do so, then undoubtedly he commits a fraud
upon the creditor who holds his paper. And if he is unable to
pay, if he is insolvent, then he commits:a fraud upon his other
creditors, by not having himself declared a bankrupt, and making
a surrender of his property'to be equally distributed among them.
It will be seen that this' act of bankruptcy is confined to. bankers, merchants, and traders, and that it extends only to the nonpayment of commercial paper, that is, to negotiable securities, to
bills of exchange, and promissory notes. These are securities of
a peculiar kind, well known to the law, and held in high respect.
There is an especial dishonor attached to their non-payment;
there i's a sort of commercial sanctity about them. They are
intended to pass from hand to hand; they are valuable instruments of commerce ; they perform many of the funbtions of money.
If, therefore, a banker, merchant, or trader suffers paper of this
description to be dishonored, and does not resume payment within
fourteen days, it argues such a state of indolvency upon his part
as to make it a fraud upon his creditors not to surrender his property for equal distribution among them'. Sueh a suspension' and
non-resumption may well be termed fraudulent. I do not mean
to say that it would be conclusive evidence of fraud, but it would
certainly be !primd facie evidence, and it would cast uporn the
debtor the burden of proving that he was perfectly solvent, and
that such. suspension and non-resumption would not have the effect
of defrauding either the holders of his' dishonored .paper, or any
of his other creditors.
Such a construction of the clause in question makes the whole
consistent and intelligible, and would render it somewhat analogous to that provision of the English Bankrupt Law, to which 1
have adverted.
It would be difficult to imagine any case better calculated than
the one now before the court, to illustrate the justic6 and propriety of such a provision. It is alleged on the part of the creditor
and not denied by the counsel of the company, that they have
issued a series of -promissory notes, falling due at successive,
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periods, and that they are utterly unable to pay them.' It is
admitted also, that they had it in contemplation to apply by their
petition to be declared bankrupts, but that upon taking the advice
of counsel they concluded not to do so. Now, it would be a
se! ious defect in our Bankrupt Act, if no provision were made by
which the creditors of such a cumpany could- compel them to surender all their estate and effects for the benefit of their creditors,
without proving any other facts than their continued suspension
and utter insolvency. If, therefore, it had been alleged in this
case that such suspension and non-resumption within fourteen
days were fraudulent, Ishould- have had no hesitation in decla'ring it to be an act. of bankruptcy,
-I see no objection, however, to allowing the petition to be
amended by the insertion of that word.

United Stdtes District Court-Districtof' Massaehusetts.
IN THE MATTER OF DANIEL.P4

KINGSLEY, A BANKRUPT.

A debt barred by the Statute of Limitations of the state where the bankrupt
resides cannot be proved against the estate in bankrnptcy.
The entry of a debt upon the schedule, by a bankrupt is not such an acknowledg
ment or new proinise as will revive the deed.
LOWELL, J.-The qfuestions certified. and argued in. this case
are, whether a. debt which is barred by the Statute of Limitations
of Magsachusetts, where the bankrupt has resided for the last ten
years, and where these proceedings are had, but not barred by
the Statute of Limitations of Vermont,' where the creditors
reside, and where both parties resided when the contracts were
made, can be proved against his estate in bankruptcy. If not,
whether the act of the bankrupt in entering the debt upon his
schedule is such an acknowledgment or new promise ds will

revive it.

To the first question it would seem to be a sufficient reply that
the Statute of Limitations would bar a suit in any court of law
in this district, and especially in the Circuit Court of the United
States. For courts in bankruptcy in disputed cases must refer
such questions to the other courts, or at least must decide'them
upon the same -principles as other courts would. Thus, by our
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statutes of bankruptcy, all such disputes may be tried, either by
prosecuting to final judgment any suit already pending, or where
the dispuite first arises after the proceedings have been begun, by
trying it according to the course of the Circuit Court in actions at
law. I cannot resist the conclusion that any plea which would be
good at law (this being a legal debt), must be good in bankruptcy.
But as the question has been decided otherwise by a judge from
whom I differ, with great hesitation (Matter of Kayl, ant , p.
283), and has been argued here at great lengtl,.I will proceed to
show why, in my judgment, the same result ought to follow upon
principle and authority, even if the mere fact that the defence is
good at law were not, as I think it is, absolutely binding and
decisive.
Statutes of Limitations are remedial and beneficial. They are
founded upon the sound principle that lapse of time, by obscuring
the truth, renders the administration of justice uncertain, and that
for the 'sake of justice as well as peace, payment ought to be presumed after a certain period has passed. If the evidence of debt
be of a high.and formal nature, the evidence of payment may be
expected to be more formally made and preserved.with more care
than in mere himAple contracts, but even in such cases, some period
works a bar. It. is not a presumption, of fact which may be
rebutted by proof of non-payment, but a conclusive presumption
of law: I Greenl. Ev. § 16. So useful and important have these
statutes been found, that the courts of -equity, when not strictly
bound by them,, have adopted them as binding rules, and they are
so regarded by the Circuit Court of the United States sit.ting.in
equity. If there were a discretion vested in the courts of bankruptcy to.adopt a'new .rule, it seems to me they would follow this
analogy.
The point was decided in this way.by Lord ELIDON, in Exl arte
Dewdney, 15 Yes. 479, and afterwards reheard and reviewed by
.the same learned judge, when he said that his first opinion was
strongly confirmed,' and that he had additional reasons for it.
But these he does notappear to have recorded, though he intendefi
to do.so: see note (a) to 2.Rose 59; -ExparteBoffe~y, 19 Yes.
468, The reasons which he has given are simple and have been
accepted in England' and his decision, though oppos'ed to a ruling
of Lord MANSFIELD at Nisi Prius and to the prac.tice of some
of the ablest commissioners of bankrupts, has been acquiesced in,
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and has -been repeatedly recognised as law, though never again
directly questioned: Ex yarte Boss, 2 G1. & J. ; Gregory v.
Hurrill, 3 B. & C. 341; Taylor v. ffyrkins, 5 Id. 489.
Besides the mischief which the Statute of Limitations was
intended to remedy, and which would be aggravated by the negligence in the preservation of evidence which-they are calculated
to induce, and do induce after their bar is supposed to shield a
debtor from suit, all which apply as strongly in bankruptcy as in
any other form of suit, there would be special -hardships ta bankrupts or supposed bankrupts, as welf as to their creditors; in
adopting a different rule- in bankruptcy from that which prevails
at law. Thus, an honest debtor, who makes a satisfactory and.
honorable composition with all his known creditors, would be liable to be prosecuted in this court as a fraudulent bankrupt for
making that very composition; and this by a person who could
not sue him in any court in this district, whi.ch is the only district
in which proceedings in bankruptcy c6uld be taken against him,
and on the hearing of such a petition the presumption of law
would "bereversed, and he would be obliged to prove that he had
paid an outlawed debt. So upon the question whether a. debtor
is insolvent or not, and many points. The mischiefs would be farreaching and intolerable.
It ig said that the Bankrupt Law, being uniform throughout the
United States, ought to be so worked as to give every creditor.
who could sue in any state or territory of the Union right to proceed in bankruptcy, and, therefore,'although it be 'granted that
some li'mitation should be applied, it must be one which would be
good throughout the Union. There is great plausibility in' this
argument, but it is not strong enough to fieet the arguments on
the other side. The right to sue must depend on the former.
Statutes of Limitations relate only to the remedy, and cannot
have any extra-territorial effect. If it were possible to have a
statute of this kind of general territorial effect throughout the
jurisdiction of the United States, it might be very useful, but
there is none such. The general rule, therefore, sought to be
applied, does not exist. If there were such a one, no doubt this
debt would be barred by it, because it is a simple contract debt
of more than ten years' standing, and such a debt is barred, I
suppose, by the statutes of every state and territory when applied
to defendants who have been within their jurisdiction for that
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period. They do not bar suits against persons not within their
jurisdiction simply because they have nothing to do with them.
Most of them, perhaps, following the common-law rule of prescription, and for purposes of convenience, bar all suits after
twenty years, and the result of holding that the law of the states
and territories where this remedy is not sought, shall be regarded,
is simply to abolish the Statutes of Limitations, and revert to a
common-law prescription. But the very fact that this debt is not
barred by the laws of Oregon, or of any other state which has no
jurisdiction over it, and because it has no jurisdiction over it,
shows to my mind that the law of such a state ought not nbw to
be applied to it. In such a matter as this the courts of the
United States must, in the absence of a law of Congress, be
guided by the law'of the former. There can be no other rule.
The argument most strongly pressed in this case on behalf of
the creditor is that the statute of bankruptcy intends that -all
debts should be discharged, wherever held ; therefore, this debt
must be. disbharged, and if so, it is a provable debt, for only
provable debts are discharged.
There can.be no doubt that this- is a provable debt, and that it
-will be discharged by the certificate, if the bankrupt obtains one.
All debts which by their nature are provable, are discharged
whether they could be proved, in fact, or not. Thus, debts due
an alien enemy, or to one dead or insane, or who accidentally
failed to. prove, or was not notified, all .these, and many othirs
that could be mentioned, would be barred, though it might be
impossible that they could be proved. Because this debt is pro.vable; it does not follow that it can be proved. The question'is
whether it is a debt at all.' A debt that has been paid cannot be
proved, but it will be dimharged . that is to say, the payment
need nbt be relied on after the certificate has been obtained. It
would be a singular reply to a plea of discharge in bankruptcy,
that the debt was not discharged because it could not have been
proved, and that it: could, not have been proved because it had
been paid, or because..the court of bankruptcy found, rightly or
otherwise, that it had been- paid. Yet that is all that the rejectioA
of this proof amounts to. Applying the law of the for.mer, I
find as a presumption of law that .this provable debt has been
paid. All provable debts are discharged ; but all supposed debts,
to which a certificate of discharge would be a bar, are not neces-
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sarily provable. This difference arises in a case like this from
the fact that the Bankrupt Law deals with the-contract itself, anddischarges it, and so necessarily has a much wider reach than
the law of limitation, or than rules of evidence which touch only
the remedy. The same thing' is true in England, and would be
so in our states excepting that (by cbnstruction) the Constituition
of the United States forbids them to deal in this mode with contracts between citizens of the different states; In England the7
Statutes of Limitations and of Bankruptcy are passed by the same
legislature, but one has a much wider -operation than the othei',
so that a debt held in Scotland or England, or the Colonies, or.
abroad, may be dicha'rged, though the Statute of Limitations
may prevent its being proved. Mr. Christian, whose .opinion and
practice had been much opposed to Ex parte -Dewdney,.gives us
to understand that tile argument that the whole debts would
necessarily be discharged, was not overlooked in the discussion
of that case. The argumeni that Congress by 'discharging debts
due throughout. the Union must intend to adopt all the Statutes
of Limitations in the Union proves t6omuch, The same argument
will show that it must have adopted those of all the commercial
countries in the world, for debts due throughout the world are.
discharged in bankruptcy if the contract were to b.e performed
here: kanter v. Potts, 4 T. R. 182.; Potter v. Brown, 5 East
124; ,May v."Breed, 7 Cush. 15; Story's Conflict of Laws,
§ 335, &c.
The hardship of this rule is much less'than at first might appear. Itis only on the supposition that thd .creditor might possibly sue his debtor away from home that there is any -hardship.at
all. All that the foreign creditor has to do -isto sue his debtor
at home, and in due season, and keep his:deht alive. Our Statute
of Limitations makes no discrimination against foreign creitors,
but, in some .respects, quite the contrary; for, if he has been
beyond seas, he has. a longer time allowed him. If within the
United States, there is no reason for any discrimination in his
favor. The complaint of any creditor that he might probably
find a foreign forum, which, because it is foreign, would give him
a remedy which he has lost by negligence in the true and proper
forum, is not entitled to much consideration. One case of practical hardship may be put, and that is When a creditor has actu.
ally sued his debtor away from home, and obtains security by
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attachment or otherwise, which would be taken away by the bank-ruptcy, and yet he would have no right to prove his debt. I
consider that the Bankrupt Law makes a sufficient provision for
such a case, for the reason that the action might be prosecuted to
final judgment, and the amount of the judgment be proved in
bankruptcy.
I agree with Judge- BLATCHFORD, that the bankrupt, by putting
the debt upon his schedule, does not make a new promise to pay
it. This depends somewhat upon the pariicular Statute of Limitations, and it has been so decided in Massachusetts, in a case
under the State Insolvent Law, so called, which is a bankrupt
Jaw. though one limited and restrained in its operation by the
Consi-itution of the United States. And it is so upon principle,
because the debtor does not make out his schedule with any view
to the payment but to the discharge of his debts. And, besides,
the creditorn have a right to plead the statute as well as he, and
they are not bound by his schedule: Bichardson v. Thomas, 13
Gray 381 ; Roscoe v. Hale, 7 Id. 274-;Stoddardv. -Doane, 7 Id.
387 ; and see the cases in Roscoe v. Hale. In these cases, it is
true, the debt. was not barred when the schedules were made, but
if lae schedule were evidence of a new promise, two of those decisioin must havo been for the plaintiff, because the schedules had
made within six years hefore suit brought. The fact weakens
ttc -,rgument to this extent, that it cannot be said the debtor .was
merely carrying out his legal duty in putting the debt in his list,
znd 'that he did it, as .it were, under legal compulsion, and not
voluntarily. I do not suppose that he would be so- bouud in
respect to this debt, but it sti.i remains true that he did it diverso
intuitu.
In the Mlatter of Harden, (9Bankrupt
Register for March 30th 1868,) Judge
Fox of the United States District Court
for Maine, concurs with Judge LOWELL
in his opinion that debts barred by
1ie Statute of Limitations of the state
whcre proceedings are had, cannot be
proved in bankruptcy, while just as we
go to press we have received a manuscript copy of opinion by Judge HALL,
of the Northern District of New York,
in the Matter of S]heppard concurring in
the opposite construction of the Bank-

rupt Act by Judge BLATCHFORD in the
Mlatter of Kay, ante p. 283.
A point of great doubt and of much
importance has thus already arisen
under the Act, on which the rulings are
likely to differ in different districts until
it shall be settled by the Supremg
Court. It is much to be regretted that
the state of the business in that Court
affords little hope that any case arising
under the Bankrupt Act will be reached
for several tears.
J. T.M.

PERRY ir. LANGLEY..

United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio.
LEMUEL PERRY v. WILLIAM H. LANGLEY.
A general assignment by an insolvnet debtor, though made for the benefit of all
Ais,
creditors, is an act of bankruptcy under the Bankrupt Act of March 2d 1867.
Where a creditor is about to get a judgment against his debtor, and the latter
makes a general assignment under a state insolvent law for the benefit of his creditors, this isa conveyance with intent to delay,'defraud,.and hinder the creditor,
and is an act of bankruptcy under sect. 39 of the Bankrupt Act.
It comes also under the description of a conveyance to defeat or delay the operation of the BankruptAct.
Where a debtor made an assignment under a state. insolvent law, and a creditor
applied to the state court to have the security of the assignees increased, this was
not such an assent to the proceedings as estbpped him from claiming that the assign-'
ment was an act of bankruptey.
A debtor made an Assignment under the insolvent law of Ohio on Ialv 25th 1867,
and under it a state court tbok cognisance of the matter.. OvrrJuly 17th-a petition
in bankruptcy was filed by-n creditor. Held, that as' to.
this matter the Bankrupt
Act of 1867 was in force on May 2.5th, and the United States court could rightfully
take jurisdiction of the whole matter under the petition filed in July.

THIS was a petition in bankruptcy, under the Act of 1867,
praying that Win. H. Langley be declared a bankrupt. The only
distinct act of bankruptcy alleged in the petition is that Langley,
then being largely insolvent, on the 25th day of May 1867,
"executed in assignment of all his property to two assignees,
named, in trust for the benefit of all his creditors. This assignment is alleged to be fraudulent and void, as intended, first, to
delay, defraud, or hinder his creditors ; second, to defeat or
delay the operation of the Bankrupt Law. -*
Langley filed an answer, admitting the assignment of his property as alleged in the petition, and his utter insolvency at the
date of its execution ; but denied explicitly that it was fraudulent,
either in fact or in law, or that it was intended to defeat or delay
the operation of the Bankrupt Act. He averrd that his object
was to prevent the petitioning creditor, Perry, from-obtaining an
unjust preference over other creditors, and to secure an equal
distribution of his property among all his creditors.
The facts were, that Langley had been engaged in business at
Gallipolis; that in the spring of 1866 he became embarrassed in
his pecuniary affairs ; that prior to the 25thiof May 1867-the
date of the assignment -with
an admission -of his hopeless
insolvency, he assigned his entire property, in trust for the benefit
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of all his creditors ; that this assignment was filed in the Probate
Court of Gallia county, and put on record on the said 25th of
May, and an order made by the Probate judge, for security by
the assignees, pursuant to the statute of Ohio on that subject;
that the assignees took possession of the property, and were proceeding to administer the same; and that "on the 17th of July,
the-said Perry filed his petition in bankruptcy, embracing a
prayer for an order restraining the assignees from any further
interference with the property of Langley under said assignment;
which prayer was granted by this court; and the assignees have
suspended all further proceedings, awaiting the judgment of the
court upon the question whether the act of bankruptcy charged
in the petition was or was not in violation of the Bankrupt Law.
Yash and T. D. Lincoln, for petitioning creditor.
Coffin, for 'Langley.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
"LEAVITT,J.-The'grounds of opposition to a decree of bank.
ruptcy against Langley, comprehensively stated, are-1. That
the assignment by him on the 25th day of May was not an act of
bankruptcy within the purview of the statute. 2. if an act of
bankruptcy, the petitioning creditor, Perry, is estopped from urging or relying upon it, by reason of his implied assent to the assignment. 3. That at the date of the assignment-the 25th of May
-- the Bankrupt Act of the 2d of, March 1867, was 'not in force,
except for a special and limited purpose ; and that the. Probate
Court of Gallia county, having rightfully obtained jurisdiction
of the assignment.under the staiute of Ohio, on the 25th of May,and prior t6 the Bankrupt Act taking full effect, is entitled to
retain it; and that the assignees are fully empowered to act under
it, and execute its provisions, irrespective of the Bankrupt Act.
I. The first question, therefore, is, whether the assignment by
Langley, is an at of bankruptcy within the meaning of the statute, upon the hypothesis that the law was then in force as appliz able to'the transactions involved in this case.
It is claimed by the counsel for the petitioning creditor, that
the assignment is joid ; first, as being executed by Langley, with
an actual, fraudulent intent; second, that, being for his entire
property, it is presumptively fraudulent, under the operation of'
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the Bankrupt Act, and, therefore, void.; and, third, that it is void
as being with an intent to defeat and delay the operation of
that act.
As'to the first inquiry suggested, namely, whether the assignment was executed with a positive, fraudulent intent, it it, per.
haps, not important to inquire. The- consideration of the other
points stated as to the legal effect of the assignment, under the
provisions of the Bankrupt Act, will be decisive of the question
before the court. If* subject to the imputation of legal, or con
structive fraud, as in conflict with the act, the effect as to its
validity is the same as if a fraud in fact were proved.
The question involves -the construction of the 39th section of
the Bankrupt Law, in confiection with the 85th, which defines
what shall constitute acts of bankruptcy. And so far as the 39th
section relates to the transfer, sale, or conveyance of "prOperty by
one who is insolvent,'it is declared to be an act of bankruptcy,
w.hen made-1. "With intent to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors." 2. "With intent'to give a prefirence to one or more
of his creditors, or to any person or persons who are or may be
liable for him, as indorsers, bail, sureties, or otherwise." 3.
"With intent * * * to defeat or delay the operation of this act."
1. Was the assignment by Langley intended to delay, defraud,
or hinder a creditor or creditors ?- The argunment in favor of the
legality and fairness of the assignment is, that being for the equal
benefit of all -his creditors, fraud cannot be presumed. Now, it
true that an assignment or conveyance of all his property by a'
bankrupt, forthe benefit of his creditors generallyj uiless with
some one of the intents specified in the 39tfli section above noticed,
is not declared to be an act of-bankruptcy. Yet, it is clear that
such an assignment is in contravention of -the spirit and poliy
of the Bnkrupt Law, even when made in good faith. The
intention of that law clearly was, that when a failing debtor
was conscious of his inability to prosecute his business and pay
his debts, he should at once subject his property to such adisposition as the Bankrupt Act has provided for. The property then
becomes a sacred trust for the benefit of his creditors, who have
a right to insist that it shall be administered, not according to
the wish or preference of the insolvent, or in accordance with the
insolvent laws of a state, but according to, the provisions of the
National Bankrupt Act. Indeed, it has been the settled doctrine
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in the United States, under any bankrupt law that has been
passed, that when Congress had called into exercise the clear
constitutional grant of power to pass a uniform bankrupt law,
the jurisdiction and legislation of the state as to the settlement
of insolvent estates, was wholly suspended, to be resumed only
when the national law ceased tb be in force. This doctrine is not
controverted, and it seems hardly necessary to refer to the cases
which sustain it.
In England the decisions have been uniform from the time of
Lord Mansfield, that an assignment of all his property, by an
insolvent debtor, for the benefit of all his creditors, was an act
of bankruptcy, even where no actual fraud was intended: Deacon on Bankruptcy 72. 73; Griffith oil Bankruptoy 107, 119, 120.
The same doctrine has been settled in this country under the
Bankrupt Act o fAugust 1840: McLean, Assignee, v. Meline et
at., 3 McLean's R. 1.90 ; also, MekLean, Assignee, v. Johnson et
al., 3 McLean's .R. 202'; Shawhan et al. v. Wherritt, 7 How.
627. And it is understood from newspaper reports, that the same
doctrine has been uniformly held by all the judges of the United
States, before- whom the question has been presented, under the
recent Act of the 2d of Mardh 1867.
And if there was any
doubt upon this question, under the 39th section of this law, it
would seem to be removed by-reference to a clause in the 35th
section of the act. The 85th section does not define acts of
bankruptcy, but declares what conveyances or transfers of -property by a bankrupt shall be deemed void, and vests no title as
against the assignee in bankruptcy. This clause is in these
words:- "And if such (any) sale., assignment, transfer, or conveyance is not made in the usual and ordinary course of business
of the debtor, thd faet *shallbe primd facie evidence of fraud."
This clause throws light upon the- intention of the legislature 'in
the enactment of the 39th. section,.and shows that any assignment or transfer of property by a failing debtor, not in the usual
.and ordinary course of business, is not only void, but evidence
of fraud. Now it cannot- be claimed that-an assignment of all a
debtor's property, fof -any purpose, is in the usual and ordinary
line of business. Its effect is to put a stop to all business, by
disposing of all the means by which it can be carried on. -And
this is one of the reasons given by the English courts why a
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general assignment of all a debtor's' property is, per se, an act
of bankruptcy.
2. But whether the assignment is void, on tie ground of presumptive fraua, it seems clear it is within the clause of the .39th
section of the act, declaring any asaignment, or transfer of pro.
perty, by one in contemplation of bankruptcy, with intent "to
delay, defraud, or hinder his creditors," shall be an act of bank.
ruptcy. 'There would seem to be no doubt, from'the facts -ir evidence, that this intent was in the mind of Langley in making this
"assignment. Indeed, he avers in his answer that this purpose was
to prevent the petitioning qreditor, Perry, from obtaining a priority "over other credit6rs. This was an intent, within the meaning.
.f the statute, to delay-or hinder a creditor from obtaining his
legal rights. Perry had sued Langley in the Common Pleas of
Gallia county for a debt of some $5000, some time prior to the
25th of May, 1867, ,dn which,by the rules of the court, he would
be entitled to a judgment, and did obtaip a-judgment on the 1st
of June, which, under the statute of Ohio, took effect and was a
itcr from the first day of the term, which was the 27th of May.
There can be no- doubt thit Perry had a right- to take all lawful
means to secure his debt. No censure could attach to him for
doing so, ihough it might give him an advantage over other creditors. All the creditors had the same right, and all who were
thus Vigilant would be entitled to all the legal benefits of their
diligence. He was defeated and delayed in this by the -act of
Langley in assigning all his property, ahd thus putting it beyond
the reach of an execution. This clearly lb.rings the assignment
within the words of the statute as an- act of bankruptcy. Langley avers- in his answer, that one object in view in making the
assignment was to prevent Perry from obtaining a preference over
other creditors ; and this, he assumes, was a meritorious purpose.
But the law does not so view it. In its effect, it was delaying.
and hindering a creditor in a legal effort to secure his debt
3. But there is still another ground, on which The' assignment
must be adjudged to be an act of bankruptcy. It was clearly
within the provision of the 39th section of the Bankrupt Act
declaring in substance that any conveyance, or transfer of property, with intent "to defeat or delay the operation of the act,"
to be an act of bankruptcy. The facts lead, with great certainty.
to the conclusion that Langley must have intended to withdraw
VOL. XVI.-28
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his property from the operation of the statute, and administer it
through trustees of his own selection, and subject to his influence,
and not by assignees selected by the creditors. If such was the
design of Langley, even if honestly intended, the assignment, in
its effect, was to defeat or delay the operation of the law. The
Bankrupt Act was approved on the 2d of March, 1867, to take
effect as to the appointment of officers and the preparation of rules
of proceeding, from that day, and for other purposes, not till the
1st day of June following. The act, immediately after its approval, was published in all the leading newspapers of the country,
and its provisions well known to the reading public. Langley, on
"the 25th of May, made the assignment in question. He had only
to wait five days, till the Bankrupt Act would be in full operation,
and the way opened for filing his petition and obtaining an
adjudication -in bankruptcy ; and thus subjecting his property to
distribution according to the just requirements of the act. Practically the assignment delayed or defeated the operation of the
law, and as I thiik, was so intended by Langley. This was depriving the creditors of*a legal right under' the statute,, and was
clearly in contradiction of its spirit nd its letter. And the fact
proved, that a few days.after the assignmerit, Langley made a
formal proposition to his creditofs to compromise with them, by
giving his promissory notes for forty cents on the dollar of'his
indebtedness, payable in'instalments within five years, may at ieast
justify the suspicion that the assignment'was intended to facilitate
such .compromise.
II. This leads me to the consideration of 'the second ground 'of
objection to a decree -of bankruptcy against Langley, namely :,
that the petitioning creditor, Perry, is estopped 'from'urging or
relying upon the assignment as an act of bankruptcy, for'the reason that he assented to it, and cannot now in good faith, objebt to
it. The well-known doctrine of estoppel is undoubtedly applicable in such a case, if the facts justify its .application. It would
clearly be in violation of a rule of good morals, as well as of law',
that onb should give his assent and approval to an act, and. afterwards for his own advantage, denounce the act as illegal and
immoral. If the proof was that Perry had advised the making
of the assignment, or, after its execution, had expressly given his
assent to it as a creditor of Langley, he would have been preoluded from insisting on it as an act of bankruptcy, and could not
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have maintained a standing in this court as a petitioning creditor.
But there is no evidence placing him in this position. The only
fact relied on is tlat, after the assignment had been made, and
assignees had been approved of by the Probate Judge of Gallia
county, and a bond ordered and given by the assignees in the very
inadequate sum of $15,000 (the assigned estate being in value
about 8175,000), Perry applied to the court to have the
penalty increased, which was done by order of the court. This
was clearly no approval of, or assent to, the assignment, and this
exception to the petition must be overruled.
. III. There yet remains for consideration the third objection to
a decree of bankruptcy against Langley. This, as before stated,
is in substance that, on the 25th day of May 1867, the date of the
assignment to the trustees, the Bankrupt Act, as to thistransaction,
was not in force ; that the statute of Ohio, legalizing such assignments, was then operative ; and the Probate Court, having rightfully acquired jurisdiction of the proceeding,'had authority to
retain it until it was ended ; and that the jurisdiction of that court
was not affected by the Bankrupt Act, which did not take full
effe6t until the 1st of Jine.
This point has been strenuously insisted on by the able counsel
representing Langley, and I' am free.to confess that as a first impression it seemed plausible, if not unanswerable. ,Upon full
reflection I am satisfied his argument is untenable, and I will
state very briefly- the reasons which have led to this conclusion.
The 50th section of the Act of March 2d 1867 provides that
the act as to the appointment of officers and the- promulgation of
rules and general orders shall 'take effect from its approvAe :
"Provided that no petition or other proceeding under- this act
shall be filed, received, or commenced before the first day of June,
A. D. 1867."
The phraseology of' this' proviso is somewhat peculiar and significant. It does rot dedlare' that the statute, as to
all matters not included in the preceding part of the section, shall
not take effect till tha first day of June, but merely that no proceedings shall be instituted under the ac before that date.. Its
effect therefore is, by a fair construction, that whilef it suspends
the right to proceed until the day named, it was the intention of
the law-makers that as to the body of its provisions, it should
take effect from its passage. If this were not the intention, why
provide specially that no petition should be filed, or other pro-
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ceeding had before the first of Jane?. If it had been intended
to postpone the operation of the entire act, except for the specific
purpose mentioned in the beginning of the section, until the day
named, it may be pertinently asked why it was not so expressed
in- clear terms? Not being so expressed, and the words used not
admitting of such a construction, the conclusion is irresistible that
it was nQt intended that the main provisions of the act should he
a dead letter until the first of June. On the contraryr, it would
seem.to be clear it was intended that these should be operative
from the day the .act was approved. The reason for the postpone.
ment of the law as to proceedings under it is well known. The
law. had made it the duty of the Supreme Court to prescribi
orders and rules in bankruptcy.; and these, from the pressure ofother duties, could not be prepared before the first of June.' For
the purpose of inisuring uniformity in the proceedings,'it became
necessary to suspend the right of petitioning until that day ; but
for all other purposes it was opertive from. its passage. And it
is most obvious that any other construction of the section referred
to would have had a very decided effect in defeating the object
of the statute. If all transactions.occurring prior to the first of
June, though plainly in conflict with the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, and involving gross frauds, were withdrawn from its
operation, and virtually legalized, great facilities would have been
afforded for the evasion of the salutary restrictions and prohibitions-of the statute. And it can hardly be imputed to Ooqngress.
that such a result could'hive been intended.
But aside from the- 50th section of the act, there are other
evidences that it was intended the statute should take effect in itl
main provisions from its passage. In the beginning of the 9th
section it is provided "that any person residing and owing debts
as aforesaid, who, after the passage of tis act," shall commit
any of the numerous acts of bankruptcy specified in the section,
may be proceeded against in bankruptcy. The words are not,
after this act shall -take effect, but, after the passage of the ict,
which means plainly, after- the 2d of March, the date of the ap.
proval of the act.. And this is not within the category of retroactive laws, as its operation is upon future transactions, and not
those that are past.
In addition to this, light is cast upon the question under review
by the 35th section of the statute. The purpose of this section is
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to point out under what circumstances conveyances and trans
fers of property by one in contemplation of bankruptcy shall be
deemed fraudulent and void; and it prescribes the duties and
powers of assignees in bankruptcy in proceedings to set asid)
such conveyances and transfers, and for the recovery of property
thus fraudulently sold -or disposed of. In the beginning of the
section it is provided "that if any person being insolvent, or in
contemplation of insolvency, within four months before the filing
of the petition, by or against him, shall dispose of his property in
the way specified, his acts shall be fraudulent and void, and the
property disposed of may be recovered by his assignee in bankruptcy." Here, it will be observed, the limitation as to time is
four months prior to the filing of the petition. And any act
within the purview of the section, committed within that time, is
declared to be fraudulent and void. Now in this case the assignment by Langley was on the 25th of May, and -the petition in
bankruptcy was filed the 17th of July following; and as less than
four months intervened, the assignment is within the operation of
the 35th section.
If, therefore, there was a doubt as to the true construction of
the 50th section of the act, the reference to the 85th and 89th
sections shows conclusively that the statute extends to transactions occurring prior to the 1st of June 1867, and that they are
proper subjects of jurisdiction under the Bankrupt Law.
Now it is not denied by counsel that the Bankrupt Act of the
2d of March 1867, so far as it defines what are acts of bank.
ruptcy, and points out the mode of proceeding, supersedes a11
insolvent laii s of the state. I have before referred to this wellsettled doctrine, and will now only cite some of the authorities
by which it is sustained: Ex parte -Earnes,2 Story's R. 824;
Judd v. Ives, 4 Mete. 401 ; 4"Wheat. 195; 5 Id. 22; and also a
very learned opinion by Judge WILLIAMS, of the District. Court
of Allegheny County, Pa., in Commonwealth v. O'Hara, 6 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 765.
It results conclusiv'ely that if the provisions of the Bankrupt
Act were in force on the 25th of May'1867, the date of the
assignment, and that assignment was within the scope and intern
of the law, and, as an act of bankruptcy, altogether null and void,
the Probate Court of Gallia county had no jurisdiction of the
assignment; and the acts of that court in, regard to it are wholly
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invalid. And no argument is needed to prove that no court can
legitimately obtain jurisdiction by any act against law a.,d inherentlv void. The argument, therefore, that the Gallia county
Probate Court, having obtained jurisdiction under the state law,
is entitled to retain it to the end of the proceeding, has no force
or application. That court had no authority to act in the matter
of the assignment, as.the jurisdiction of this court was paramount
and exclusive. There is, therefore, no conflict of jurisdiction.
A decree in bankruptcy must be entered ; and the usual order
for a warrant is directed to be made. As a matter of course, the
motion to dissolve the injunction heretofore granted, is overruled.

United States District ourt-Southern -Districtof New York.
IN THE MATTER OF OLIVER W. DODGE, A BANKRUPT.

Where at the time of the application for a discharge, the assignee has neitber
received, nor paid any moneys on account of the estate, the case is' to be regardeJ
as one in which no assets have come into his hands.

TRE only assets of the bankrupt consisted of certain notes,
accounts, and claims, all past due and unpaid, in which he had a
one-seventh interest valued at $250, which interest had passed to
the assignee,.who*had not received or paid any moneys whatever,
for 6r on account of the bankrupt's estate.
One or more creditors proved their. claims against the estate
of the bankrupt.
More than sixty days having elapsed since the adjudication of
bankruptcy, the question arose whether the bankrupt could now
apply to the court for his discharge under section 29 of the act
on the ground that there are no assets; whether accounts, claims,
and demands from which nothing may be collected or realized are
to be considered to be assets within the meaning of said section 29
so as to prevent the bankrupt from making application for his
discharge until after the expiration of six months.
On the request of the parties the question was -ertified to the
judge for his opinion thereon.
BLATL HFORD, J.-Where at the time of the application for a
discharge, the assignee has neither received nor paid any moneys
on account of the estate, the case is to be regarded as one in

